COMMENTS
The Use of Government Judgments in
Private Antitrust Litigation: Clayton Act
Section 5(a), Collateral Estoppel, and Jury Trial
Prior to the enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914,1 a judgment
against a defendant in a government antitrust prosecution could not
be used as an estoppel against that defendant in a suit later brought
by a private plaintiff. The doctrine of mutuality of estoppel, which
provides that a judgment may be asserted as an estoppel only by
one who would be estopped by that judgment if it had been decided
against him, protected the defendant from being estopped from
2
denying that he had violated the antitrust laws. Section 5(a) of the
Clayton Act was designed to aid a private plaintiff bringing suit
after a successful government antitrust prosecution by providing
that the prior judgment or decree could be used in the later suit as
prima facie evidence of all matters which the3 judgment "would be
an estoppel as between the parties thereto."
I 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1973).
" See text and notes at notes 30-31 infra; cf. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225
U.S. 111 (1912). "It is a principle of general elementary law that estoppel of a judgment must
be mutual." Id. at 127. See also Buckeye Powder Co. v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours Powder Co.,
248 U.S. 53, 63 (1918) (which held that an antitrust judgment rendered prior to the enactment
of the Clayton Act was inadmissible in a private suit brought under the Act).
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or criminal
proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the
effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such
defendant under said laws or by the United States under section 15a of this title, as to
all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between
the parties thereto: Provided,That this section shall not apply to consent judgments or
decrees entered before any testimony has been taken or to judgments or decrees entered
in actions under section 15a of this title.
38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970).
Section 5 uses the term "estoppel" in a unique way. It is not used in its typical sense to
define the effect of a prior judgment but rather to define the circumstances in which the
decree is to be admissible as prima facie evidence. Thus the decree is admissible only if it
would be admissible as an estoppel if the Government, rather than a private plaintiff, were
bringing the subsequent suit. See Shores, Treble Damage Antitrust Suits: Admissibility of
PriorJudgments Under Section 5 of the Clayton Act, 54 IOWA L. REv. 434, 445 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Shores]. The term "estoppel" used in the statute refers to collateral
estoppel rather than res judicata. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558,
569 (1951); Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35, 65 (D. Minn. 1966) (supplemental
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Section 5(a) gave the private antitrust plaintiff of 1914 a valuable new tool, but the protection it provides has become somewhat
unnecessary over time. The doctrine of mutuality of estoppel has
lost much of its vitality and it is doubtful whether it would today
operate to deny a private plaintiff the benefit of a successful government antitrust prosecution. 4 Since Congress has determined that
private antitrust plaintiffs are a favored class of litigants, one might
have expected the courts to have supplemented section 5(a) by allowing a prior successful government judgment to be asserted as an
estoppel even in the absence of mutuality. The courts have, nevertheless, consistently maintained that section 5(a) bars the application of collateral estoppel in this situation.' As a consequence, prior
government judgments lack conclusive effect in the private suit and
the defendant can introduce evidence to rebut the prima facie case
and force the private plaintiff to litigate the case as if the
Government had never established a violation.6 Thus, in light of the
opinion), affd sub nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 912 (1967); see Note, Closing an Antitrust Loophole: Collateral Effect For Nolo Pleas
and Government Settlements, 55 VA. L. REv. 1334, 1335-36 n.6 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
VIRGINIA NOTE]; Comment, Clayton Act, Section 5: Aid to Treble Damage Suitors? 61 YALE
L.J. 417, 420-21 n.15 (1952) [hereinafter cited as YALE COMMENT].
See text and notes at notes 30-43 infra.
See, e.g., Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 308 F. Supp. 584 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd
on other grounds, 453 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972). The court
held that collateral estoppel did not apply to a Federal Trade Commission order in a subsequent civil suit. The court stated: "The Commission order cannot be both prima facie and
conclusive;. . ." 384 F. Supp. at 589. See also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 307 F. Supp.
1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
In addition, several courts have assumed but not decided that a prior government judgment could only have prima facie effect under section 5(a). See Sam Fox Publishing Co. v.
United States, 366 U.S. 683, 690 (1961); Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340
U.S. 558, 568 (1951); Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709, 724 (9th Cir. 1959);
Deluxe Theatre Corp. v. Balaban & Katz Corp., 95 F. Supp. 983, 986 (N.D. Ill. 1951).
8 A government decree introduced as prima facie evidence is, by itself, sufficient to
sustain a judgment on the issues for which it is submitted even though it only shifts the
burden of coming forward with evidence and not the burden of proof. When the defendant
comes forward with rebuttal evidence, as will typically be the case, the case proceeds much
as if the decree were never introduced. Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35, 65 (D.
Minn. 1966) (supplemental opinion), aff'd sub. nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 912 (1967). The Supreme Court has recognized that the
prima facie provisions of section 5(a) are often "of limited practical value." Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 319 (1965); see VIRGINIA
NOTE, supra note 3, at 1352; YALE COMMENT, supra note 3, at 420 n.14. As one commentator
has remarked:
Despite language in cases which indicates that the purpose of Section 5(a) is to give
private litigants a formidable weapon, its actual accomplishments may be somewhat less
potent. In no way does it measurably decrease the overwhelming task of discovery-the
long, tortuous process in which often scores of lawyers are engaged for years in ferreting
out facts in what is now termed "waves of discovery." Nor has the experience shown that
it either decreases the length of time from inception to ultimate disposition of an antitrust case or the actual length of trial.
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general decline of the mutuality principle, section 5(a) has come to
be a detriment to the very parties it was designed to benefit.7
This comment will examine the applicability of the principle of
collateral estoppel when a private plaintiff attempts to rely on a
prior successful government antitrust prosecution. After examining
the text and legislative history of section 5(a) of the Clayton Act,
the comment argues that Congress did not intend to foreclose the
application of collateral estoppel in this situation. Since Congress
did not, on the other hand, indicate how collateral estoppel was to
be applied, the comment then tests each of the wide range of judgments that may be obtained by the Government against settled
principles of collateral estoppel and determines the suitability of
estoppel in each case. Finally, this comment addresses the potential
argument concerning the right to jury trial that may be raised by
recognition of collateral estoppel in this context and concludes that
application of collateral estoppel will not impermissibly impair this
right.
I.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION

5(a)

Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act does not on its face indicate
whether a judgment against a defendant in a government antitrust
prosecution can or should collaterally estop that defendant from
denying the violation in a subsequent private action. The courts,
however, have been willing to assume that it cannot, reasoning that
since Congress has decided that a judgment obtained by the
Korman, The Antitrust PlaintiffFollowing in the Government's Footsteps, 16 VILL. L. REV.
57, 69 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Korman].
I This anomaly has not gone unnoticed:
It is thus ironic that the very section originally intended to assist private plaintiffs in
their use of government actions may operate instead to prevent application of new
judicial concepts for their benefit.
Korman, supra note 6, at 85. Korman and several other commentators have argued that the
Clayton Act should be amended to make prior government judgments conclusive evidence in
later private actions. See id. at 84-85; Comment, ProposedAmendment to Section 5(a) of
ClaytonAct Would Increase EvidentiaryAid for Subsequent Litigants,39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 518
(1964); YALE COMMENT, supra note 3, at 425. For a thorough discussion of the amendments
to the Clayton Act proposed in 1965 to this effect, see VIRGINIA NOTE, supra note 3. This
comment, on the other hand, argues that courts can give government judgments collateral
estoppel effect without waiting for an amendment to the Clayton Act. See text and notes at
notes 8-29 infra. Although it might be argued that congressional consideration and rejection
of a proposal to accord government judgments collateral estoppel effect demonstrates that
Congress does not desire such a result, it is a basic maxim of statutory construction that later
expressions of intent cannot alter the original legislative intent. See, e.g., Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974). Since the 1965 amendments never made it
out of committee, it would be difficult to determine the intent of the entire Congress with
regard to collateral estoppel in this context.
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Government shall have prima facie effect, such a judgment can not
also have conclusive effect.8 But section 5(a) does not state that the
government judgment shall merely serve as prima facie evidence; its
language can plausibly be read as mandating that such a judgment
shall have at least prima facie effect, thus leaving the courts the
discretion to determine whether to give the judgment the conclusive
effect of collateral estoppel. Since an ambiguity appears on the face
of the statute, it is appropriate to examine the legislative history of
the Clayton Act to determine if Congress intended to preclude the
application of collateral estoppel in this situation.
Section 5(a) was included in the Clayton Act 9 to facilitate more
vigorous private enforcement of the antitrust laws. Even though the
Government had successfully prosecuted several major cases under
the Sherman Act, these prosecutions were rarely followed by private
suits,'" largely, it was believed, because private litigation was so
expensive." In response to a plea by President Wilson to ease the
burden on the private antitrust plaintiff,12 the House Judiciary
Committee proposed legislation that would have made a government antitrust judgment conclusive in a subsequent private action
against the same defendant.' 3 Out of "fairness" to the defendant,'4
See cases cited at note 5 supra.
Prior to the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1973), the only federal
antitrust statute was the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1973), enacted in 1890.
The Clayton Act was passed in 1914 in order to provide a more precise statutory enumeration
of antitrust violations. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER
A

MATERIALS

29 (1974).

" In the twenty-four years between the adoption of the Sherman Act and the Clayton
Act, only forty-six private antitrust actions were filed and, of these, only four were successful.
See VIRGINIA NOTE, supra note 3, at 1336-37 n.8; Hardy, The Eviscerationof Section 5 of the
Clayton Act, 49 GEO. L.J. 44, 45-46 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Hardy].
" 51 CONG. REC. 9090 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell); 51 CONG. REC. 9270 (1914)
(remarks of Rep. Carlin); 51 CONG. REC. 9490 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Floyd); 51 CONG. REC.
9492-93 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Lenroot).
12 President Wilson declared:
I hope that we shall agree in giving private individuals. . . the right to found their suits
for redress upon the facts and judgments proved and entered in suits by the Government
where the Government has . . . won . . . .It is not fair that the private litigant should
be obliged to set up and establish again the facts which the Government has proved.
H.R. Doc. No. 625, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914).
1,The original House bill provided:
That whenever in any suit or proceeding in equity hereafter brought by or on behalf of
the United States under any of the antitrust laws there shall have been rendered a final
judgment or decree to the effect that a defendant has [violated] . . .any of the antitrust laws, said judgment or decree shall, to the full extent to which such judgment or
decree would constitute in any other proceeding an estoppel as between the United
States and such defendant, constitute in favor of or againstsuch defendant conclusive
evidence of the same facts, and be conclusive as to the same questions of law in favor of
or against any other party in any action or proceeding brought under or involving the
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however, the Committee bill went further than President Wilson's
proposal and proposed making the result in the government action
conclusive in subsequent
suits even if the earlier judgment was in
15
favor of the defendant.

When the Committee bill came before the House for consideration, many Congressmen were seriously concerned that it violated
due process because it would estop a plaintiff who had never had a
"day in court" from litigating his claim if the defendant had prevailed in the government action."5 Sentiment in the House favored
instead providing for a one-way estoppel that would preclude the
defendant from relitigating an issue adversely determined in the
government action but that would not prevent a private plaintiff
from litigating a claim the Government had pressed unsuccess17

fully.

Even though some Representatives questioned whether even

such a modified provision would be constitutional in light of the
principle of mutuality of estoppel,"5 the House approved and sent
to the Senate a bill providing that a prior government judgment
would be conclusive in favor of, but not against, a private plaintiff. 9
The Senate Judiciary Committee, however, had grave doubts
regarding the constitutionality of the House bill even though the
Committee approved its basic policy."0 To avoid due process problems, it recommended that prior government judgments be given
only prima facie rather than conclusive effect in subsequent private
actions.2 1 When the House bill, accompanied by this recommendation, was referred to the Senate floor, debate again focused on its
constitutionality under the mutuality requirement. Although some
Senators believed the House bill was constitutional,2 2 a majority,
though again in favor of aiding private litigants, found an insurmountable obstacle in the principle of mutuality of estoppel.2 Thus
provisions of any of the antitrust laws.
51 CONG. REC. 9200 (1914) (emphasis added).
" 51 CONG. REC. 9270 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Carlin).
" See note 10 supra. The two-way estoppel aspect of the bill was fully understood. 51
CONG. REC. 9073 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb); 51 CONG. REC. 9090 (1914) (remarks of Rep.
Mitchell); 51 CONG. REC. 9165 (1914) (exchange between Rep. Scott and Rep. Floyd).
11See, e.g., 51 CONG. REc. 9200 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Green); 51 CONG. REC. 9491-92
(1914) (remarks of Rep. Prouty).
'1 See, e.g., 51 CONG. REc. 9079 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Volstead). See also 51 CONG. REc.
9201 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Green).
1151 CONG. REC. 9487 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Volstead); 51 CONG. REc. 9491 (1914)
(remarks of Rep. Green).
" 51 CONG. REC. 9911 (1914).
20 S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1914).
21

2

Id.
See, e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 13851 (1914) (remarks of Senator Walsh).
CONG. REc. 13853 (1914) (remarks of Senator Chilton); 51 CONG. REC. 13854 (1914)

22 51
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uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of one-way estoppel coupled with a strong desire to give private litigants some relief, 4 motivated the Senate 5 and later the House2 to accept the recommendation of the Senate Judiciary Committee to make a successful government judgment only prima facie evidence of a violation of the
antitrust laws.
Congress did not, therefore, as some courts have assumed,2
intend to withhold collateral estoppel effect from government antitrust prosecutions by providing that successful judgments would be
prima facie evidence in subsequent private suits. By passing section
5(a), Congress intended to give the private litigant as much aid in
establishing a violation of the antitrust laws as was then perceived
to be possible under the Constitution. Since Congress viewed this
aid as a supplement to the private litigant's common law arsenal,2 8
(remarks of Senator Chilton); 51 CONG. REc. 13900 (1914) (remarks of Senator White). To
overcome the mutuality hurdle, several members of Congress suggested that a private litigant
might be considered to be in privity with the Government. See 51 CONG. REc. 13854 (1914)
(remarks of Senator Cummins). This argument was rejected. 51 CONG. REc. 13899 (1914)
(remarks of Senator Borah).
Subsequent case law has demonstrated that the mutuality requirement is not a constitutional principle. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
24 Several Senators were concerned that if the Supreme Court declared a statute modeled
on the House Bill unconstitutional, a prior government judgment would be given no effect in
a subsequent suit. Confronted with this uncertainty, many Senators decided it would be
better to give private litigants a limited amount of certain aid rather than risk having the
bill declared unconstitutional. 51 CONG. REc. 13855 (1914) (remarks of Senator Chilton); 51
CONG. REc. 13898 (1914) (remarks of Senator Culberson); 51 CONG. REc. 13855 (1914) (remarks of Senator Cummins); 51 CONG. REc. 13900 (1914) (remarks of Senator White).
25 51 CONG. REc. 13907 (1914).
24 51 CONG. REc. 16276 (1914).
E.g., Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 308 F. Supp. 584 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd
on other grounds, 453 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972).
" Senator Overman, for instance, described the effect of section 5:
[w]e have given to the citizen, in addition to the remedy he now has, an additional
remedy, so far as the future is concerned, and we have not taken away by the statute
any right which he now has.
51 CONG. REC. 16058 (1914). See also 51 CONG. REC. 15939 (1914) (exchange between Senator

Nelson and Senator Overman). This characterization was not challenged.
Additional support for the proposition that Congress did not intend the bill to be an
ouster of the common law can be found in the debate over the proviso to section 5(a), which
excepts consent judgments from having prima facie effect. The following exchange between
Senator Norris and Senator Nelson indicates that the bill was not intended to preclude other
means of utilizing private judgments:
MR. NORams. Notwithstanding the proviso, which says that the section shall not apply
to certain cases, suppose that in all other respects it was proper to offer a judgment in
evidence and there was no reason why it should not be admitted, assuming that in other
respects the judgment is proper evidence, then this proviso would not exclude it, as I
understand.
MR. NELSON. No.
51 CONG. REC. 15939 (1914).
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it is doubtful that Congress would have intended to deny the private
litigant use of any subsequent beneficial common law
developments. This conclusion has particular force in the case of the
demise of the principle of mutuality of estoppel because it was that
doctrine that compelled Congress to temper section 5(a) in the first
place. Since section 5(a) cannot be read as ousting the common law
doctrine of collateral estoppel,"5 it is therefore necessary to examine
the doctrine itself to determine its applicability in the antitrust
area.
Although the above exchange dealt specifically with the consent decree exception of
section 5(a), it is apparent that Congress did not intend to withhold from private litigants
the right to use established common law doctrines.
11In 1955 the Clayton Act was amended to give prior judgments prima facie evidence in
a later suit for damages brought by the Government. These amendments provide a stronger
argument for ouster of the common law. The 1955 amendments can be traced to the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941), holding that the
United States could not recover damages when injured by an antitrust violation. To fill the
loophole created, Congress added section 4A to the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), giving
the Government the right to sue for actual but not treble damages. At the same time,
Congress amended section 5(a) to provide that a prior government judgment shall be prima
facie evidence in an action brought by the Government for money damages. It is unclear,
however, exactly why Congress amended section 5(a). Since the mutuality requirement
would be satisfied for the second government action, the Government would presumably
have been able to rely on the prior judgment as an estoppel without statutory amendment.
Neither the House nor Senate Reports contain any reference to the rationale for the amendment of section 5(a). The sparse congressional debates are similarly uninformative on this
point.
Two possible explanations seem the most plausible. It is conceivable that Congress
intended to oust the common law doctrine of collateral estoppel as a compromise measure
for allowing the government to sue for actual damages. The one case in which the question
of the applicability of collateral estoppel arose in this context adopted this view. United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 307 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The only authority cited for this
conclusion by the court was a statement at the hearings on the bill that the amendment of
section 5(a) would place the "United States in the same category as the private litigant."
See Hearings on H.R. 3658 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1955) (remarks of Stanley N. Barnes). But placing the Government
in the "same category" as the private litigant indicates only that the Government would have
the same statutory remedy as the private litigant and does not, by itself, suggest that its
common law rights would not survive. The more plausible explanation, given the total absence of discussion of this problem in the House and Senate Reports and Congressional
debates, is that Congress simply did not consider the interplay between the statute and
collateral estoppel.
Even if Congress did intend to oust the doctrine of collateral estoppel when the government sues for actual damages, it is clear that this intent would not indicate whether the
original framers of the Clayton Act intended to oust the common law with respect to private
litigants. It is well settled that postpassage declarations of intent cannot change the original
legislative intent. See, e.g., Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
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II.

OFFENSIVE USE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND THE
PRIVATE ANTITRUST PLAINTIFF

A. The Demise of the Mutuality Requirement
Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, 0
has dual purposes-to protect litigants from the burden of relitigating issues already determined with the same adversary or his privy
and also to promote judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." For many years, however, the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel confined the operation of collateral estoppel by providing that
neither party to a suit could use a prior judgment as an estoppel
against the other unless both parties were bound by that prior judgment."2 Based on the simplistic assumption that it is unfair to allow
a party to use a prior judgment decided against his current adversary to preclude relitigation of an issue when he would not have been
bound by a decision in favor of his adversary,s the mutuality requirement grants a party who has litigated and lost an opportunity
to relitigate identical issues with new parties. Justice Traynor forcefully criticized this rule in Bernhard v. Bank of America: 4

No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for a requirement of mutuality. Just why a party who was not bound
by a previous action should be precluded from asserting it as
res judicata against a party who was bound by it is difficult to
35
comprehend.
Led by Justice Traynor's assault in Bernhard, the mutuality
requirement has been abandoned in many jurisdictions.36 In
38The distinction between res judicata and collateral estoppel is a familiar one. Under
the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit
involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. Under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, the second action is upon a different cause
of action and the judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated
and necessary to the outcome of the first action. 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405[11],
at 622-24 (2d ed. 1974); e.g., Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955);
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351,
352-53 (1876).
3 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0405[2], at 631 (2d ed. 1974).
31 Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912); RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS

§ 93 (1942).

It is a violation of due process to bind a litigant by a judgment to which he was neither
a party nor a privy. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940); cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1877).
3 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
3 19 Cal. 2d at 812, 122 P.2d at 895.
11Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313
(1971); e.g., Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Hogan, 476 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1973); James
Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1971); Brown v. R.D. Werner
3
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Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
3 7 the Supreme Court added momentum to this trend
Foundation,
when it decided the relatively narrow question of whether "mutuality of estoppel is a viable rule where a patentee seeks to relitigate
the validity of a patent once a federal court has declared it to be
invalid."38 But the "broader question," which formed the backdrop
for the Court's decision, was "whether it is any longer tenable to
afford a litigant more than one full and fair opportunity for judicial
resolution of the same issue.""
In its analysis, the Court first took note of the general trend in
the state and federal courts away from the mutuality requirement
and then, in this light, examined the economic consequences of
requiring mutuality in patent cases. The Court noted that the "arguable misallocation of resources" 4 involved whenever a party is
allowed to relitigate issues that had been determined adversely in a
prior action is particularly acute in patent cases because they
involve "staggering expense" and length.4 ' The mutuality rule, the
Court further noted, not only wastes the resources of the courts and
litigants, but also permits the patentee to extract monopoly profits
for a non-patentable invention. A defendant in an infringement
action frequently finds it cheaper to pay royalties than contest the
patent's validity by way of defense to the action even where the
patent has been declared invalid in a prior decision.4 2 Finding no
persuasive reason for maintaining mutuality of estoppel in patent
Co., 428 F.2d 375 (1st Cir. 1970); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 934 (1964); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 865 (1950); Realty Exch. Corp. v. Phoenix Title & Trust Co., 15 Ariz. App. 199, 487 P.2d
420 (1971); Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969);
Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Ore. 1, 474 P.2d 329 (1970); Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485
P.2d 1044 (1971); Lucas v. Velikanje, 2 Wash. App. 2d 888, 471 P.2d 103 (1970). A number of
jurisdictions have recently affirmed, however, their adherence to the mutuality rule. E.g.,
Daigneau v. National Cash Register Co., 247 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1971); Lukacs v. Kluener, 290
N.E.2d 125 (Ind.1972); Keith v. Schiefen-Stockham Ins. Agency, Inc., 209 Kan. 537, 498 P.2d
265 (1972); Howell v. Vito's Trucking & Excavating Co., 386 Mich. 37, 191 N.W.2d 313 (1971);
Armstrong v. Miller, 200 N.W.2d 282 (N.D. 1972); see Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344,
350, 517 P.2d 396, 399 (1974) (dictum), cited in Peffer v. Bennett, 523 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir.
1975).
37 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
at 327. In Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936), the Court had held that a de3 Id.
termination of patent invalidity in a prior action does not preclude a party from asserting
the validity of the same patent in subsequent litigation against a different defendant.
11Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313,
328 (1971).
,0Id. at 329.
Id. at 334, 348.
42 Id. at 338.
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litigation, the Court held that a patentee could be estopped from
asserting the validity of a patent declared invalid in a prior suit if
he had had "full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim in the first
43
action."
B.

The Applicability of Blonder-Tongue in Antitrust Litigation

The doubts expressed by the Court in Blonder-Tongue with
respect to affording a patentee more than one full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issue are equally valid in the
antitrust context. Antitrust litgation, like patent litigation, is characterized by long" and expensive" trials. These factors are at least
partially responsible for the relatively poor success record of private
antitrust plaintiffs" and thus undermine the Congressional policy
of encouraging private enforcement of the antitrust laws.4"
3 Id. at 347, 350. Although the Court did not abolish the mutuality requirement in
general, it did state that "it is apparent that the uncritical acceptance of the principle of
mutuality of estoppel. . . is today out of place." Id. at 350.
4, See Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. LAW & ECON. 365, 374
(1970) [hereinafer cited as Posner]. See also Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest
Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167, 169 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Loevinger];
Wheeler, Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1319, 1330-31
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Wheeler].
11In 1949, Thurman Arnold stated:
[P]eople keep coming to me from all parts of the country with antitrust claims against
some combination of corporations. I tell them that if they do not have $25,000 . . . they
had better drop the suit. They will find themselves in the middle of suit without any
evidence.
Quoted in Hearings on H.R. 3408 before the Subcomm. on Study of Monopoly Power of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary,82d Cong., 1st Sess., No. 1, pt. 3, at92 (1951). Such an action
would undoubtedly cost more in today's dollars. See also Alioto, The Economics of a Treble
Damage Claim, 32 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L. J. 87, 93 (1966); Wheeler, supra note 44, at 1330-31.
" Wheeler, supra note 44, at 1330-31. It is widely believed that the Government has a
much better success ratio in antitrust cases than private plaintiffs. Alioto, supra note 45, at
92; Arnold, The Supreme Court and the Antitrust Laws 1953-1967, 34 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J.
2, 4-5 (1967); Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4
ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1959); Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by PrivateParties:Analysis of
Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010 (1952). But Professor Posner has
questioned the validity of such studies because they rely solely on reported cases that have
gone to judgment. Professor Posner also suggests that the "spottier success of private antitrust claimants" before the Supreme Court as compared with the high degree of success
achieved by the Government might be due to the fact that the Solicitor General screens cases
very carefully whereas private plaintiffs are more likely to commence actions without merit.
Posner, supra note 44, at 382-83. The Supreme Court, however, has shown considerable
enthusiasm for the private antitrust action. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392
U.S. 135 (1968). See also Dam, Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel: Neither a Borrower, Nor a Lender Be, 1969 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 12, 37-38.
'1 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968); Leh v.
General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 59 (1965); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey
Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 317-18 (1965); Radovich v. National Football League, 352
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Collateral estoppel, by shortening private suits, would encourage
private enforcement. 8
The vast majority of private antitrust treble damage actions are
brought after a government prosecution has successfully established
the defendant's violation of the antitrust laws. 49 But since a private
litigant may make only limited use of the Government's judgment
under section 5(a) as presently interpreted," the defendant, by presenting rebuttal evidence, can compel the private plaintiff to undertake full-scale discovery and to relitigate the Government's entire
case.5 However, even where the defendant has had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate his claim in the first action-which will typically be the case if the first action was a government prosecution for
injunctive relief that went to judgment-the private litigant will
have to establish that he was injured by the defendant's violation"
and that he is entitled to damages for that injury in any event. No
sound policy requires that the private plaintiff bear the burden of
reestablishing the defendant's violation. 4 By depriving the private
plaintiff of the full benefit of the Government's successful prosecution, the mutuality requirement functions as an economic deterrent
to private antitrust enforcement. Since, as in Blonder-Tongue, private litigants may be deterred from attempting to enforce their
rights, the mutuality requirement may indirectly induce the violation of the antitrust laws.
U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957); Bruce's Juices, Inv. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-53
(1947).
,9The private antitrust plaintiff must also prove injury in fact and some indication of
the damage suffered. See, e.g., Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 514 F.2d 690 (5th Cir.
1975); Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 218 F. 447, 448 (2d Cir. 1914). In attempting to
establish injury and damages the plaintiff may, to some extent, be forced to reestablish points
that also bear on the issue of liability. The availability of collateral estoppel may not, therefore, significantly aid private antitrust plaintiffs in certain cases.
" Posner, supra note 44, at 372; Wheeler, supra note 44, at 1323.
10See note 6 supra.
5,See note 6 supra; Comment, Section 5(a) of the ClaytonAct and the Use of Collateral
Estoppel by a Private Plaintiff in a Treble Damage Claim, 8 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 74, 80
(1973); VIRGINIA NOTE, supra note 3, at 1352; YALE COMMENT, supra note 3, at 425.
52See Comment, Proof Requirements in Anti-Trust Suits: The Obstaclesto Treble Damage Recovery, 18 U. CH. L. REv. 130, 131-32 (1950). CompareLocker v. American Tobacco
Co., 218 F. 447 (2d Cir. 1914), with Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
33See Hoffman, Proof of Damages in Private Litigation, 36 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 151
(1967); Lanzilloti, Problems of Proof of Damages in Antitrust Suits, 16 ANTITRusT BULL. 329
(1971); Comment, supra note 52.
1,The existence of an antitrust conspiracy may be particularly difficult to establish. See,
e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 687 (1948) (100,000 page record compiled in three
years of FTC hearings).
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C.

The Offensive-Defensive Distinction
Even though many of the reasons relied on by the Court in
Blonder-Tongue apply with equal force when a private litigant attempts to make use of a successful government action for injunctive
relief, there is one major difference between the two situations-the
private antitrust litigant is seeking to use collateral estoppel offensively whereas the Blonder-Tongue situation involves defensive
use."5 Several recent cases have followed Blonder-Tongue by sanctioning the defensive use of collateral estoppel in antitrust litigation 6 and several more have suggested that offensive use of collateral estoppel may be available to injured parties following a private
antitrust suit. "7 But because of the present interpretation of section
5(a), 5 no cases have allowed offensive use of collateral estoppel
when a private plaintiff follows a successful government judgment.59
1 Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when the plaintiff seeks to estop the defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in an
action with another party. Defensive use occurs when a defendant seeks to estop the plaintiff
from asserting a claim the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost against another defendant.
1, See, e.g., Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 517 F.2d 117 (5th Cir.
1975); Raitport v. Commercial Banks Loc. Within This Dist., 391 F. Supp. 584 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
11J.M. Woodhull, Inc. v. Addressograph Multigraph Corp., 62 F.R.D. 58, 61 (S.D. Ohio
1974); Bill Minielli Cement Contracting, Inc. v. Richter Concrete, 62 F.R.D. 381, 386 (S.D.
Ohio 1973); Wall Prod. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., Civil No. 46414-A (N.D. Cal. 1971)
(offensive collateral estoppel is available), noted in Comment, Section 5(a) of the Clayton
Act and the Use of CollateralEstoppel by a Private Plaintiff in a Treble Damage Action, 8
U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 74, 88 (1973); see id. at 87-88. For a discussion of the possibility of
dispensing with the notice requirement in class actions under FED. R. Civ. P. 23 and thereby
allowing offensive use of collateral estoppel in the class action context, see Dam, ClassAction
Notice- Who Needs It? 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 97.
5 See note 2 supra. It seems odd to allow offensive use of collateral estoppel after a
private antitrust suit but not after a government suit when section 5(a) was enacted expressly
to aid private litigants following government suits. See text and notes at notes 8-29 supra.
11In other contexts, courts have recently generally permitted offensive use of collateral
estoppel. E.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934
(1964); Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298 (D. Md. 1967); United States v.
United Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. & D. Nev. 1962), aff'd, 335 F.2d 379 (9th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Vanguard Recording Soc'y, Inc. v. Fantasy Records, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 410, 100 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1972); Thill v. Modem Erecting Co., 284
Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969); Desmond v. Kramer, 96 N.J. Super. 960, 213 A.2d 26
(1967); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967);
Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Ore. 1, 474 P.2d 329 (1970).
RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975) states that there is "no

intrinsic difference" between offensive and defensive use. See id. at § 88, Reporter's Note at
99. But see, e.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir.
1965); Spettigue v. Mahoney, 8 Ariz. App. 281, 445 P.2d 557 (1968); Nevarov v. Caldwell,
161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (1958); Albernaz v. City of Fall River, 346 Mass. 336, 191
N.E.2d 771 (1963).
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Since Congress did not necessarily intend to foreclose collateral estoppel in this situation, this comment will now examine the three
principal arguments that have been offered for limiting the use of
offensive collateral estoppel to determine if they provide a sufficient
rationale for refusing to grant a government antitrust judgment, in
particular a government injunction, conclusive weight in a subsequent private suit.
1. The Multiple ClaimantAnomaly. The most familiar argument for not applying collateral estoppel offensively against a defendant is what Professor Brainerd Currie termed the "multiple claimant anomaly.""0 In Professor Currie's oft-cited illustration, a railroad collision injures fifty passengers, all of whom bring separate
actions against the railroad. The railroad prevails in the first
twenty-five actions,"1 but in suit twenty-six, plaintiff wins. On the
strength of this example, Professor Currie contends that offensive
estoppel should not be allowed, because if it is allowed plaintiffs
twenty-seven through fifty will automatically recover from the rail2
road simply by proving damages.
Although the fears of injustice expressed by Professor Currie
have substance in general, the scenario he postulated is unlikely to
occur where a private antitrust plaintiff brings an action after a
prior successful government suit. Professor Currie's views were
based on the suspicion that the verdict for plaintiff in the twentysixth suit was probably an "aberration."" While the possibility of
an incorrect and therefore aberrational verdict undoubtedly always
exists, the vigor with which antitrust charges are usually contested 4
assures that "decisions in such suits represent the closest approximation to objective certainty possible in litigation."65 Moreover, it
Various commentators have expressed reservations regarding the desirability of offensive
estoppel. B. Currie, Mutuality of Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV.
281 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Currie]; Semmel, CollateralEstoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1457 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Semmel]; Note, The
Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Impacts]. Professor Currie later tempered
his reservations. B. Currie, CivilProcedure:The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25 (1965).
60 Currie, supra note 59, at 285-89.
66 No matter how many suits a defendant wins, a plaintiff not a party or in privity with
a party to one of those suits cannot be barred from asserting his own claim. See note 28 supra.
62 Currie, supra note 59, at 304.
Id. at 289.
, See note 44 supra. For an example, though perhaps not typical, of how vigorously
antitrust proceedings are litigated, see United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp.
881 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), rev'd in part, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), on remand, 85 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y.
1949), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Loew's, Inc. v. United States, 339 U.S. 974 (1950). This
suit was contested on the merits for thirteen years.
,5Hardy, supra note 10, at 48.
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is unlikely that an antitrust defendant would successfully defend a
series of related suits before losing a single, but fatal decision. The
enormous costs of private antitrust litigation would probably deter
potential plaintiffs from following unsuccessful predecessors. And if
a plaintiff were to attempt to establish a claim that a prior plaintiff
could not, it would probably be because he viewed the prior judgment as the aberrant decision.
In reality, the situation where offensive estoppel is most likely
to be asserted is where the Government brings the first suit against
the defendant and is successful."6 Since the defendant has lost the
first suit, application of offensive collateral estoppel will not produce inconsistent results. If doubts regarding the correctness of the
first judgment are sufficient to reject estoppel here, then it is hard
to see why a party should ever be able to assert collateral estoppel
or res judicata; an incorrect judgment is an ever-present danger.
Professor Currie's fears thus prove too much.
It is possible, however, that offensive estoppel could generate
anomalous results if the successful government suit that was the
basis for estoppel were preceded by one or more unsuccessful private
actions. If a private plaintiff brought an action following the government judgment, the trial court would have to decide whether to
estop the defendant from relitigating the issues that were determined in the government suit. Under Professor Currie's analysis,
the existence of prior inconsistent judgments would cast doubt on
the correctness of the government judgment and therefore it should
not be the basis for an estoppel in a subsequent suit.8 Recent cases
interpreting Blonder-Tongue, however, have emphasized that the
application of collateral estoppel does not depend on whether the
prior finding was "correct" but rather on whether the plaintiff had
"a full and fair opportunity to litigate" in the prior suit." If the
See text and note at note 48 supra.
As Professor James has stated:
[Clollateral estoppel like any other aspect of res judicata always involves the possibility
of perpetuating error. . . . But this possibility is a price society has decided to pay...
for the benefits that flow from finality.
James, ConsentJudgments as CollateralEstoppel, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 173, 187 (1959).
'7 Currie, supra note 59, at 304.
" See Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1973); CarterWallace, Inc. v. United States, 496 F.2d 535 (Ct. Cl. 1974). Although these cases involved
defensive estoppel, the courts' reasoning was equally applicable to offensive use. But cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (Tent. Draft No. 2) § 88(4), providing that estoppel can
be denied where the determination relied upon as preclusive was itself inconsistent with
another determination of the same issue. But one of the two cases relied upon in the commentary (see Reporter's Note at 101) is Blumcraft, which stands for precisely the opposite
proposition. The other case cited in support of its position, Fink v. Coates, 323 F. Supp. 988
"

'7
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defendant had had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" in the
government suit, then, under current principles of estoppel, the
existence of prior inconsistent judgments should not preclude estoppel, Professor Currie's fears notwithstanding.
2. Adverse Impact on Consolidation. Defensive use of collateral estoppel will generally prevent a plaintiff who has tried his
claim unsuccessfully from
relitigating the identical issues by
"switching adversaries."' 0 Defensive estoppel therefore promotes
judicial economy by removing any incentive that plaintiffs might
have not to join all potential defendants in the first action." It has
been argued, however, that offensive estoppel will increase rather
than decrease overall litigation 2 because potential plaintiffs will not
intervene in on-going suits, realizing that they have everything to
7
gain and nothing to lose by staying out of the first action. 1
The preferable way to treat this problem in general is not to
deny all use of offensive estoppel but to grant discretion to the trial
courts to deny the benefits of estoppel to a plaintiff who reasonably
could have joined in the first action.7 4 But such a drastic solution is
not necessary when private antitrust plaintiffs adopt a wait-and-see
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), does not deal with inconsistent prior verdicts. Nevertheless, some courts
have hinted that they would not allow collateral estoppel to be applied offensively if it would
lead to inconsistent results. See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 955-56 (2d Cir.
1964).
7 Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 813, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942).
" In Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
865 (1950), the court stated, "While the claimant was not obliged thus to consolidate his suits,
no canon of fairness requires that he be given the special advantage of twice trying the same
issue where he did not elect to join them." See Impacts, supra note 59, at 1025.
72 Semmel, supra note 59, at 1473-79; Impacts, supra note 59, at 1032-36.
'3 If the plaintiff wins the first action, then other claimants can use that judgment as
collateral estoppel against the same defendant in subsequent actions. But if the plaintiff loses
the first action, other claimants will not be barred unless they were parties or privies to the
action. See note 33 supra. Therefore, the prospective plaintiff is likely to adopt a "wait-andsee" attitude. See Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 767-68, 327 P.2d 111, 115 (1958);
Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, 571-72, 213 A.2d 26, 32 (1965).
1,The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 59, § 88 (3), provides that
offensive use of collateral estoppel may be denied when the party asserting it could have
joined in the original action. However, the Restatement specifies that estoppel should be
denied only when the circumstances suggest that the plaintiff wished to avail himself of the
benefits of a favorable outcome without incurring the risk of an unfavorable one. The Restatement makes clear, moreover, that the plaintiff retains the "normally available option" of
prosecuting his own claim without the impediment of joining with others "whose situation
does not substantially coincide with his own." See id. § 88 (3), comment e. Since the private
antitrust plaintiff will be attempting to prove a different cause of action than the Government, and will be seeking different relief (treble damages), see text and note at note 49 supra,
it is unlikely that a failure to attempt to intervene in a government suit would preclude the
private plaintiff from relying on the government judgment. Moreover, it is probable that the
private plaintiff would not be permitted to intervene in a government suit. See text and note
at note 77 infra.
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attitude with respect to government prosecutions because Congress
evidently assumed that they would do so. The prima facie evidence
provision of section 5(a) was an attempt on the part of Congress to
encourage plaintiffs to follow and take advantage of prior government actions,"5 as was the provision of section 5(b) of the Clayton
Act"5 tolling the statute of limitations when the Government files
suit. Moreover, since a private plaintiff would probably not be permitted to intervene in a government prosecution," there is no reason
to penalize him for failing to do so.
3. The Unfavorable Liability-FavorableDamages Dilemma.
A third argument against offensive estoppel is that it may work an
unfairness on a defendant who lost the first action but who had only
minimal damages assessed against him." If the defendant decided
not to appeal because the damages were so low, he will be unable
to deny his liability if later sued by other plaintiffs on the same
claim.7 9 To insure himself against potentially staggering liability, a
defendant might be forced to file a protective appeal even though
he considered the results of the first suit otherwise satisfactory.
In fact, the possibility of offensive estoppel will rarely force an
antitrust defendant to file a protective appeal. The antitrust defendant already has strong incentives to appeal an adverse judgment.
, See text and notes at notes 10-11 supra.
7' Whenever any criminal or civil proceeding is instituted by the United States to
prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any antitrust laws . . . the running of the
statute of limitations in respect of every private right of action . . . shall be suspended
during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter ....
15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1970).
" In SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236 (2d Cir. 1972), the court refused
to allow victims of a securities fraud to intervene in an SEC enforcement action. The court
believed that private intervention would place too heavy a burden on the government enforcement machinery by injecting additional issues into already complicated lawsuits and would
also hamper government attempts to obtain consent decrees. It is probable that a private
antitrust plaintiff would meet similar resistance if he attempted to intervene. Cf. Trbovich
v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972); Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366
U.S. 683 (1961). But cf. Loevinger, supra note 44, who suggests that private antitrust plaintiffs should be allowed to intervene in government proceedings.
,1 See Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966). Plaintiff sought $500,000 damages for injuries sustained in a
plane crash. Defendant chose not to appeal a verdict of $35,000 and the judgment was not
given collateral estoppel effect in a later action against a different plaintiff on a claim of over
$7,000,000.
"1Defendants will be particularly likely not to appeal if future suits were not foreseeable.
See Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1944). Although it may be argued that
it would be unjust to permit offensive estoppel to be asserted against a defendant who could
not reasonably foresee the likelihood of future suits in time to appeal, given the large percentage of private antitrust suits following successful government judgments, see text at note 48
supra, few defendants in government actions could credibly argue that private treble damage
suits were unforeseeable.
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A defendant might appeal a small antitrust judgment or a
government-obtained injunction simply to avoid adverse publicity
or stigma. More important, the prima facie effect already accorded
to adverse findings under section 5(a) in subsequent private treble
damage suits is in itself a significant incentive. Finally, even if the
possibility of collateral estoppel does tip the balance in favor of an
appeal in a few cases, it still seems clear that far more unnecessary
litigation would result if offensive estoppel were not permitted at all
in antitrust cases. Since antitrust defendants will appeal most adverse judgments in any event, the possibility of a few unwarranted
appeals is not a sufficient reason for foreclosing the use of offensive
estoppel; defendants should not, moreover, be able to control the
weight to be given to an adverse judgment in a subsequent suit by
choosing not to appeal." Thus this argument, like the two preceding
ones, fails to offer a convincing rationale for refusing to permit a
private plaintiff to introduce a prior government judgment against
the same defendant as conclusive evidence of the defendant's antitrust violation.
III. PARTICULAR APPLICATIONS OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
WHEN A PRIVATE PLAINTIFF FOLLOWS A GOVERNMENT
JUDGMENT

Even though a judgment rendered in a successful government
prosecution for injunctive relief should have collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent private action, it does not necessarily follow
that all types of government orders should be granted conclusive
effect. This comment will now examine the applicability of collateral estoppel where the prior judgment stemmed from either a Federal Trade Commission order, a consent judgment or a criminal
prosecution.
A.

FTC Orders

Section 11 of the Clayton Act' empowers the FTC to enforce
the Clayton Act concurrently with the Justice Department.12 Although FTC enforcement orders are admissible as prima facie eviCf. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1973).
Clayton Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970), gives the FTC the power to enforce §§ 2, 3, 7,
and 8 of the Act.
82 See generally Posner, supra note 44; Rockefeller & Ward, Antitrust Enforcement By
the FTC and the Departmentof Justice: A Primerfor Small Business, 22 DIcK. L. REv. 251
(1962).
"
'
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dence under section 5(a),83 the question of whether a FTC order can
have collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent civil action has been
dealt with only in Purex Corp. v. Procter& Gamble Co. .4 The Purex
court held that a prior FTC order could not be asserted as collateral
estoppel, but it based its decision on the erroneous assumption that
section 5(a) preempts the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 5 The question of the weight to be accorded a FTC order in a subsequent
private suit therefore remains open.
In United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co.," the
Supreme Court put to rest any doubts that administrative agency
determinations could not have res judicata or collateral estoppel
effect in subsequent legal actions. 7 The Court stated that granting
conclusive effect to an agency decision is proper when the agency
"is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact
properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportuA3

See New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346

(3d Cir. 1964), afl'd, 381 U.S. 311 (1965). The court reasoned that an FTC proceeding is in
reality a suit by the United States and that by virtue of the Finality Act of 1959, 21 U.S.C. §
21(g), an FTC order, whether appealed or not, is a "final judgment or decree" rendered in a
"suit or proceeding in equity brought by or on behalf of the United States" within the
meaning of section 5(a). The court distinguished such cases as Proper v. John Bene & Sons,
295 F. 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1923) and Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. American Bowling &
Billiard Corp., 150 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1945), which had held that FTC orders were not "final"
and therefore inadmissible, on the ground that these cases were decided before the Finality
Act was enacted and were therefore no longer good law.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that an FTC proceeding tolls the statute of
limitations under section 5(b) but expressed "no opinion" on whether an FTC order is admissible under section 5(a). Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co.,
381 U.S. 311 (1965). Subsequent lower court decisions, however, have uniformly held that
FTC orders are admissible under section 5(a). Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 453 F.2d
288 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972); Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v.
Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1970).
FTC orders pursuant to section 5 of the FTC Act, however, are generally inadmissible
under section 5(a). In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Y
& Y Popcorn Supply Co. v. ABC Vending Corp., 263 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1967). Section
5, which empowers the FTC to proscribe unfair competition and deceptive acts in commerce,
is by statutory definition not an antitrust law. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 44 (1970); see, e.g., Pep
Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1941). If the FTC decree
included a finding that the defendant not only engaged in unfair methods of competition but
also violated an antitrust law, the decree can be admitted as prima facie evidence in a
subsequent treble damage action. See, e.g., Y & Y Popcorn Supply Co. v. ABC Vending
Corp., 263 F. Supp. 709, 712-13 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
11308 F. Supp. 584 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd on othergrounds, 453 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972).
u See text and notes at notes 8-29 supra.
Al 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
87 Before this decision, there were inconsistent lower court decisions on this question.
Compare, e.g., Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1947), with Aiken v.
Cogswell, 201 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
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nity to litigate. .
88 Under this test, a FTC order should be given
collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent private action. 89
Examination of the FTC Rules of Practice" indicates that a
FTC antitrust enforcement proceeding is much like a judicial proceeding and offers litigants a full opportunity to be heard before
decision." The FTC commences the proceeding by filing a complaint containing notice of the alleged violations92 and the desired
relief.9 3 After the respondent is given a chance to answer the complaint, 4 a pre-trial conference is available on the motion of either
party or the administrative law judge.15 Each party has broad discovery rights,98 may present evidence, cross-examine witnesses,
make objections, and otherwise has "all other rights essential to a
fair hearing, 9 7 including a presumption of innocence. After the
- 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966). The Court did not define further the elements of the standard
it announced.
"' The Utah Constructionstandard has been applied to accord collateral estoppel effect
to other administrative agency determinations. See generally Groom v. Kawasaki Motors
Corp., USA, 344 F. Supp. 1000 (W.D. Okla. 1972). National Labor Relations Board unfair
labor practice determinations, for example, pursuant to § 8(b)(4) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970), have been held to estop the respondent from
denying the unfair labor practice in a suit for damages brought under § 303 of the Act, 29
U.S.C. § 187 (1970). E.g., H.L. Robertson & Assoc. v. Plumbers Local 519, 429 F.2d 520 (5th
Cir. 1970); Painters Dist. Council 38 v. Edgewood Contracting Co., 416 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir.
1969); Texaco, Inc. v. Plasterers Local 685, 343 F. Supp. 267 (W.D. La. 1972), aff'd per
curiam, 472 F.2d 594 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 906 (1973). But see Riverton Coal Co.
v. United Mine Workers, 453 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir. 1972).
16 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.72 (1975).
" In Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 73-74 (1st Cir. 1970),
the court noted that an FTC proceeding includes every major protection provided in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
12 16 C.F.R. § 311(b)(2) (1975); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). If a respondent cannot frame
a responsive answer, he may move for a more definite statement. 16 C.F.R. § 3.11(c) (1975);
cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
" 16 C.F.R. § 3.11(b)(3) (1975); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3).
" 16 C.F.R. § 3.12(b)(1)(ii) (1975); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b). A respondent has thirty days
to file an answer after having been served with a complaint. 16 C.F.R. § 3.12(a) (1975); cf.
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a).
16 C.F.R. § 3.12(b)(1)(i) (1975); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Amendments to the pleadings
are permitted, either by leave of the administrative law judge, 16 C.F.R. § 3.15(a)(1) (1975),
or by conformance to the evidence. 16 C.F.R. § 3.15(a)(2) (1975); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b). If
events occur subsequent to the pleadings which are relevant to issues involved, the administrative law judge may permit service of supplemental pleadings. 16 C.F.R. § 3.15(b) (1975);
cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(d).
" 16 C.F.R. § 3.21(a), (d) (1975); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
" Parties may request admissions, 16 C.F.R. § 3.31 (1975); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 36; conduct
depositions, 16 C.F.R. § 3.33 (1975); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 30, 31; and compel the production of
documents, 16 C.F.R. § 3.34 (1975); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 34. Failure to comply with discovery
orders is punishable by a variety of sanctions. 16 C.F.R. § 3.38 (1975); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
" 16 C.F.R. § 3.41(c) (1975).
's

Id. § 3.43(a).
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administrative law judge issues an order99 based on a written opinion,100 either party may appeal the administrative law judge's deci1' respondents who lose before
sion to the Commission; 01
the Commission have a further but limited right to review by the court of appeals.102 Since the FTC proceeding is substantially similar to a judicial proceeding,103 and the respondent is given an adequate, if not
full opportunity to be heard, it would not be improper for the courts
to grant conclusive effect to a finding in a FTC proceeding that the
respondent violated the antitrust laws. Such a rule, moreover,
would be compatible with the current practice of allowing FTC
orders to be used for collateral estoppel purposes in later suits between the same parties. 0 4
B.

Consent Decrees
Even if consent decrees

'

were not exempted from having prima

' Id. § 3.51(b).
10 Id. The opinion must include conclusions regarding all material issues of fact, law or
opinion, and the reasons for the conclusions.

"' Id. § 3.52(a).
112Clayton Act § 11(c), 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21(c) (1970). The
court of appeals is to uphold Commision findings that are supported by substantial evidence.
'1 There are only two material differences between an FTC proceeding and a civil proceeding before a court. First, unlike the federal courts, the FTC contains both an adjudicative
and a prosecutorial branch. However, the FTC operates under the internal separation of
functions plan of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21(c) (1970), and its Rules
of Practice attempt to minimize the danger of possible abuses by providing that investigators
and prosecutors never serve as judges in adjudicatory hearings. 16 C.F.R. § 3.42(a) (1975).
Moreover, the Rules forbid hearing officers from working under the supervision of any officer
involved in a prosecutorial or investigative capacity. 16 C.F.R. § 3.42(f) (1975); cf. Marcello
v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260
(1954).
The second, and more significant difference, is that hearsay evidence may be admissible
in an FTC proceeding. 16 C.F.R. § 3.43(b) (1975). Since an FTC proceeding does not involve
a jury, this difference is not that substantial. A hearing examiner experienced in the law
should be able to weigh hearsay evidence correctly. See K. DAvis, AM1NisTRATME LAW
TREATiE §§ 14.00, -.01 (Supp. 1975); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp.
349, 355 (D. Mass. 1950). See also Matteoni, An Antitrust Argument: Whether a Federal
Trade Commission OrderIs Within the Ambit of the Clayton Act's Section 5, 40 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 158, 166 (1965); 15 ViLL. L. REv. 739, 745 (1970). Finally, the respondent in an FTC
proceeding is protected against unwarranted reliance on hearsay testimony by his right to
appellate review. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229-30 (1938)
(Hughes, C.J.).
'" United States v. Williard Tablet Co., 141 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1944); United States v.
Hindman, 179 F. Supp. 926 (D.N.J. 1960). As one court said about these decisions: "Necessarily implicit in these decisions is the proposition that a Final Commission order is qualitatively comparable to a court judgment." Farmington Dowell Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co.,
421 F.2d 61, 76 n.38 (1st Cir. 1970).
1' See generally Dabney, Consent Decrees Without Consent, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1053
(1963); Flynn, Consent Decrees in Antitrust Enforcement: Some Thoughts and Proposals,53

The University of Chicago Law Review

[43:338

facie effect under section 5(a), the parties in a government suit
would have strong incentives to settle prior to judgment."°6 By joining in a consent decree, the Government achieves its primary objective of ceasing the defendant's antitrust violation and in the process
frees its limited prosecutorial resources for use elsewhere. The advantage to the defendant is also obvious: a long, expensive and
potentially embarrassing trial can be avoided, generally without an
admission of guilt. °7 By excluding consent decrees from section
5(a),10 8 Congress hoped to further encourage such economical, outof-court settlements by providing defendants with an additional
incentive to capitulate voluntarily.' 9
Even though Congress clearly intended to deny consent judgments prima facie effect, the legislative history of the Clayton Act
suggests that consent judgments could be admissible as evidence in
subsequent suits for certain purposes. 10 Thus, as in the case of
government judgments in general, Congress did not necessarily intend to preclude the courts from according consent judgments collateral estoppel effect. The Supreme Court, however, has followed
general principles of common law"' in antitrust cases and denied
L. REV. 983 (1968); McHenry, The Asphalt Clause-A Trapfor the Unwary, 36 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1114 (1961); Sullivan, Enforcement of Government Antitrust Decrees by PrivateParties:
Third Party Beneficiary Rights and Intervenor Status, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 822 (1975);
Comment, Consent Decreesand the PrivateAction: An Antitrust Dilemma, 53 CALIF. L. REv.
627 (1965); VIRGINIA NOTE, supra note 3; Comment, Section 5 of the Clayton Act and Entry
of Consent Decree Without Government Consent, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 459.
,0 Approximately 80 percent of all civil antitrust suits in the Government's favor are
consent judgments. Posner, supra note 44, at 374; Comment, Private Participationin Department of JusticeAntitrust Proceedings,39 U. CHI. L. REv. 143 (1971).
,0,
Dabney, supra note 105, at 1060; Flynn, supra note 105, at 1003.
100 See text of statute at note 3 supra.
109 51 CONG. REC. 15824 (1914) (remarks of Senator Lewis); 51 CONG. REC. 16276 (1914)
(remarks of Rep. Webb). The consent decree exemption was sharply attacked by other senators. 51 CONG. REC. 15821 (1914) (remarks of Senator Reed).
110See the exchange between Senator Nelson and Senator Clapp, supra note 28. It was
generally agreed, however, that private litigants would have been unable to make any use of
a consent judgment under then existing law. 51 CONG. REC. 15824 (1914) (remarks of Senator
Reed); 51 CONG. REc. 15939 (1914) (remarks of Senator Nelson).
"I 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.444[3], at 4018 (2d ed. 1974); United States v.
International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502 (1953); Purvis v. Great Falls Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 266 F. Supp. 661 (D. Mont. 1967). But see Ansara v. Regan, 276 Mass. 586, 177 N.E.
671 (1931); Biggio v. Magee, 272 Mass. 185, 172 N.E. 336 (1930); Kelleher v. Lozzi, 7 N.J.
17, 80 A.2d 196 (1951); Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Waldroup, 38 N.J. Super. 419, 119
A.2d 172 (App. Div. 1955). The commentators are in unanimous agreement that consent
judgments should not be accorded collateral estoppel effect. See, e.g., 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE
0.444[3], at 4024 (2d ed. 1974); James, Consent Judgments as Collateral
Estoppel, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 175 (1959); Polaski, CollateralEstoppel-Effects of Prior
Litigation, 39 IowA L. REv. 217, 226 (1954).
A consent judgment, even if not entitled to collateral estoppel effect in a later suit on a
IowA
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the use of a consent judgment from a private antitrust suit as an
estoppel in a subsequent suit on the grounds that the consent decree
was not adjudication on the merits.1 1 2 This result seems correct and
should be followed where the consent decree is from a government
suit."' Recognition of collateral estoppel in this situation would not
only violate the parties' understanding of the consent order, it would
also frustrate, by eliminating one of the defendant's incentives to
capitulate, the congressional policy of conserving the Government's
prosecutorial resources.
Since the private antitrust plaintiff should and probably will
not be able to assert a government consent decree as collateral estoppel in a later suit, the remaining question is whether the defendant can control the weight to be given a government judgment
by "unilaterally" consenting to the entry of a consent decree.' If a
defendant can do so he can, in government injunctive actions, voluntarily agree to cease his behavior without paying any damages or
increasing the likelihood of having to do so in the future.1 1 5 If, on the
other hand, the Government can withhold its consent from the entry
of a consent judgment, it can force the defendant to undergo a trial
to which section 5(a) will apply or it can condition its consent on
the defendant admitting that it has violated the antitrust laws.1 6
different cause of action, is res judicata between the parties in a later suit upon the same
cause of action. E.g., Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 327 (1955); United
States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 506 (1953).
112 Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 327 (1955).
",Although it could be argued that the parties to a consent decree intend the decree to
operate as an estoppel as between them in subsequent suits, see James, supra note 111, at
175, this intention is unlikely in antitrust cases. Since one of the prime incentives an antitrust
defendant has for negotiating a consent decree with the Government is that the judgment
will not be prima facie evidence in a later treble damage suit (see text at note 107 supra), it
cannot be argued that the defendant intended to estop himself from denying he had violated
the antitrust laws if later sued again by the Government.
"I A consent decree has traditionally meant a court order based on a bilateral agreement
between the parties. See, e.g., United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932); Swift &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928); United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 1 F.R.D.
424 (N.D. Ohio 1940). But there is some support for the view that in antitrust cases, only the
unilateral consent of the defendant is needed. "'[C]onsent' does not necessarily refer to or
indicate bilateral agreement. . . " Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 371
(D. Minn. 1939), aff'd on other grounds, 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644
(1941).
"I Somewhat analogously, defendants in actions for injunctive relief are generally unable
to moot the case by voluntarily ceasing the challenged behavior. See Comment, Substitution
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure25(d): Mootness and Related Problems, 43 U. CHI. L.
REv. 192, 212-14 (1975).
"I In a few cases, the Government has successfully insisted on the inclusion of a so-called
"asphalt clause" in an antitrust consent decree. The clause states that the defendant has
violated the antitrust laws and that the consent decree will be prima facie evidence of that
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The question whether the entry of a consent decree requires the
bilateral consent of the Government and the defendant is most
likely to arise in one of two situations. First, where there is a bona
fide disagreement regarding the necessity of certain items of relief,
the Supreme Court case of United States v. Ward Baking Co."7 is
controlling; it holds that a consent decree cannot be entered over the
objections of the Government. The second situation-where there is
agreement on what relief is necessary, but the Government insists
on an admission of liability in order to aid private litigants-has
proved to be more difficult. Several cases have held that the Government may refuse to enter into a consent agreement and force a
trial unless the defendant admits its liability.118 In United States v.
Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.,"' however, a district court in Wisconsin reached an opposite conclusion. Noting that the Government
and the defendant had otherwise agreed on the proper relief, the
court held that the Government could not insist to impasse on the
inclusion of an admission-of-liability consent decree in light of the
statutory purpose of section 5(a), and that even the most flagrant
violator had an "unqualified right" to avoid "the prima facie sanction by capitulation. 2' 0
Brunswick, which if followed would grant a defendant an "unqualified right" to enter into a consent decree and deprive private
litigants of the benefits of a government judgment, can be criticized
on at least two grounds. First, it cannot be reconciled with the
legislative history of the Clayton Act. The purpose of the consent
decree exemption was to aid the government enforcement machin2
ery, not to grant defendants an unqualified right of avoidance.1 1
Second, permitting defendants to enter into a consent decree to
which the Government was opposed would vitiate the ability of the
Government to enforce the laws; if the rights of the accused to enter
into a consent decree are superior to the Government's right to
fact in the future. United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., 1961 Trade Cas. 69,923 (D. Mass.
1960); United States v. Bituminous Concrete Ass'n, 1960 Trade Cas. 69,878 (D. Mass. 1960);
United States v. Lake Asphalt & Petroleum Co., 1960 Trade Cas. 69,835 (D. Mass. 1960).
"' 376 U.S. 327 (1964).
118 See note 116 supra.
"'
230 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Wis. 1962).
110
Id. at 664.
I See note 109 supra;Dabney, supra note 105, at 1062; Sullivan, supra note 105, at 840;
Comment, Section 5 of the Clayton Act and Entry of Consent Decree Without Government
Consent, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 459, 462. But cf. Shores, supra note 3, at 444 (approving of
Brunswick).
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negotiate, then the alleged violator will be able to establish the
Government's prosecution policy.
The Government, therefore, should have discretion to reject a
defendant's proposed consent decree in those few cases where it
desires to expend its limited resources on litigation despite the defendant's willingness to capitulate. This flexibility is necessary both
to allow the Government to aid potential private litigants 122 as well
as to enable the Government to litigate suits that it believes will
establish important precedents. Where a consent decree is rejected
by the Government and the defendant either admits liability or is
unsuccessful in the ensuing trial, the defendant should be collaterally estopped from denying a violation of the antitrust laws in a
subsequent treble damage suit. 12
C.

Criminal Judgments

In addition to its authority to seek injunctive relief, the Justice
Department has statutory authority to bring criminal antitrust actions.'2 In determining whether criminal convictions can have collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent civil action, distinctions must
be drawn between jury verdicts, guilty pleas, and nolo contendere
pleas.
1. Jury Verdicts of Guilty. There has been considerable
dispute over whether, in general, guilty verdicts should be available
for collateral estoppel purposes. 12 51 When the parties are the same in
successive suits, as when the Government follows a criminal conviction with a civil action, the general rule is that the prior judgment
is conclusive between the parties.2 6 When the parties are not the
'2 Cf. United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y.

1955).

in See cases cited note 116 supra. By admitting liability, the defendant would agree
that the judgment would have conclusive rather than prima facie effect in a subsequent
private action. It may be objected that according a forced admission collateral estoppel effect
will produce more rather than less litigation since defendants would rather litigate than enter
into such a decree. But this argument is highly speculative: the Government will not insist
on admissions of liability in cases it does not want to try if it has reason to fear that the
defendant would not capitulate under those terms. Also, where the defendant admits liability, litigation will be reduced.
12415 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970).
225 See generally Vestal & Coughenour, Preclusion/ResJudicata Variables: Criminal
Prosecution, 19 VAD. L. REv. 683 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Vestal & Coughenour].
2 E.g., Moore v. United States, 360 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1965); Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz,
334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965). Thus where the Government
first established a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws in a criminal action, the
defendant was collaterally estopped from relitigating the existence of a conspiracy in a subse-
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same in the second suit, however, the courts have reached inconsistent results. At one time, the mutuality requirement barred the use
of a prior criminal judgment as collateral estoppel in a subsequent
civil proceeding not brought by the Government.1 2 But with the
demise of the mutuality requirement, 128 many state 129 and federal"'

courts have given criminal judgments conclusive weight in subsequent civil suits.
The modem tendency of allowing criminal judgments based on
a verdict of guilty to have collateral estoppel effect should be followed in antitrust cases. If a civil judgment can be given conclusive
weight in a subsequent civil suit, it follows that a criminal judgment
should be given similar effect because of the higher burden of proof
and greater safeguards in a criminal proceeding. 31 No strong policy
calls for preventing private antitrust plaintiffs from relying on a
prior criminal antitrust conviction in a subsequent treble damage
32
claim to establish a violation of the antitrust laws.
2. Guilty Pleas. Despite some strong contrary dictum from
earlier cases,'3 it is now generally accepted that judgments based
on guilty pleas can have prima facie effect under section 5(a) in
subsequent treble damage suits."4 But, as in the case of criminal
quent civil injunctive suit brought by the Government. Teamsters Local 167 v. United States,
291 U.S. 293 (1934).
"I Chatangco v. Abaroa, 218 U.S. 476, 481 (1910). See also, e.g., Brown v. Moyle, 133
Colo. 29, 290 P.2d 1105 (1955); Smith v. New Dixie Lines, Inc., 201 Va. 466, 111 S.E.2d 434
(1959); Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301 (1922).
'
See text and notes at notes 30-43 supra.
'z Cardillo v. Zyla, 486 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1973); Bressan Export-Import Co. v. Conlew,
346 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d
601, 375 P.2d 439, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1962); Newman v. Larsen, 225 Cal. App. 2d 22, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 883 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Hurtt v. Stirone, 416 Pa. 493, 206 A.2d 624, cert. denied,
381 U.S.'925 (1965). But see Brooks v. State, 259 Ind. 678, 291 N.E.2d 559 (1973); Wheelock
v. Eyl, 393 Mich. 74, 223 N.W.2d 276 (1974). A few jurisdictions hold that prior criminal

convictions are admissible in a subsequent civil proceeding, but the prior judgment is not
conclusive of issues determined. E.g., Asato v. Furtado, 52 Hawaii 284, 474 P.2d 288 (1970).
' United States v. Frank, 494 F.2d 145, 160 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 828 (1974) (dictum).
' See Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 606, 375 P.2d 439,
441, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 561 (1962) (Traynor, J.).
32 See Korman, supra note 6, at 84. But Korman believes judicial application of collateral estoppel is unlikely absent new legislation. See note 6 supra. The Supreme Court has
observed that a court is to handle the difficult problem of determining what was resolved in
the prior government criminal action by reviewing the record in its entirety including the
pleadings, jury instructions, evidence submitted and opinions, if any. Emich Motors Corp.
v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 569 (1951).
'1 See, e.g., Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939), aff'd
on other grounds, 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941) (dictum).
11 Armco Steel Corp. v. North Dakota, 376 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1967); General Elec. Co.
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jury convictions, no sound policy requires that a guilty plea should
be limited to prima facie effect.'35 For purposes of collateral estoppel, the general rule is that both jury verdicts and guilty pleas are
to have conclusive weight so that those who have exercised their
right of self-defense will not be penalized for having done so.' 3 Even
though allowing guilty pleas to have collateral estoppel effect is not
free from all difficulty,'37 the private antitrust plaintiff should be
able to rely on prior government judgments in which the defendant
pleaded guilty unless the defendant can establish that extenuating
circumstances compelled the plea.' 5
3. Nolo Contendere Pleas. Unlike guilty pleas, nolo contendere pleas have consistently been held to fall within the consent
v. City of San Antonio, 334 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1964); City of Burbank v. General Elec. Co.,
329 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F.2d
412 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964); United States v. Englehard-Hanovia,
Inc., 252 F. Supp. 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). But cf. Northwest Elec. Power Co-op, 30 F.R.D. 557
(W.D. Mo. 1961).
"I Guilty pleas in antitrust cases, like such pleas in general, Dunham v. Pannell, 263
F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1959); Dimmick v. Follis, 123 Ind. App. 701, 111 N.E.2d 486 (1953); Book
v. Datema, 256 Iowa 1330, 131 N.W.2d 470 (1964), have been held admissible in subsequent
suits as an admission against interest. See, e.g., Simco Sales Serv. v. Air Reduction Co., 213
F. Supp. 505, 507-08 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
13 Vestal & Coughenour, supra note 125, at 715; e.g., Brazzel v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489
(5th Cir. 1974); Metros v. United States Dist. Court, 441 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1970); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 939 (1964) (by implication); United States v. Guzzone, 273 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1959);
Hooper v. Guthrie, 390 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Schneider, 139 F.
Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons, 127 F. Supp. 907 (D.N.J.
1955). But cf. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 605-06, 375 P.2d
439, 441, 125 Cal. Rptr. 559, 561 (1962) (dictum) (guilty pleas should not have collateral estoppel effect because they may only reflect a compromise or a belief that paying a fine is more
advantageous than litigation); 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.418[1], at 2706 (2d ed.
1974). There are two strong incentives for an antitrust defendant not to plead guilty. First,
guilty pleas are admissible as prima facie evidence in subsequent treble damage suits. See
cases cited note 134 supra. Second, section 162(g) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
prohibits corporate defendants from deducting as a business expense the full amount of any
judgment or settlement in a private antitrust suit if the defendant had earlier pleaded guilty
or nolo contendere on the same set of facts.
"I It will be difficult, in the subsequent suit, to determine how much of the indictment
is admitted by the guilty plea. See Note, The Admissibility and Scope of Guilty Pleas in
Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 71 YALE L.J. 684, 694-700 (1962).
"I Professor Vestal suggests that the defendant should be given a chance to explain the
circumstances surrounding his plea of guilty before he is prevented from relitigating. If the
defendant could demonstrate that the plea represented a desire to avoid the cost and time of
a trial rather than to admit guilt, then collateral estoppel would be inapplicable. See Vestal
& Coughenour, supra note 125, at 717. But see note 136 supra. Any increase in overall
litigation that may result if defendants are forced to contest criminal charges should be more
than offset by a corresponding simplification of subsequent civil litigation. Moreover, defendants who wish to capitulate without pleading guilty may attempt to plead nolo contendere (see text and notes at notes 139-47 infra) to avoid being collaterally estopped in later
suits.
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39
decree exception to the section 5(a) prima facie evidence sanction.
At common law, nolo pleas lacked collateral estoppel effect. 40 Thus,
whether nolo pleas are viewed as a type of consent judgment or are
viewed under the common law, it seems clear that they cannot be
conclusive in later litigation. A more difficult question is whether
an antitrust defendant can plead nolo as of right in order to control
the weight to be given to his criminal conviction in subsequent
actions.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure vests the
trial judge with broad discretion to reject a nolo plea. 4 ' In light of
this discretionary power, the Justice Department has attempted to
persuade courts to reject nolo pleas entered by defendants accused
of so-called "hard-core" antitrust violations. 42 Some courts have
held that nolo pleas should be accepted uniformly to further the
section 5(a) policy of encouraging capitulation,1 3 but others have
rejected nolo pleas where the alleged violations were particularly
4 Neither view has dominated.
flagrant."
In deciding whether to allow an antitrust defendant to plead
nolo, the courts should attempt to include a consideration of the two
apparently contradictory policy objectives of section 5(a) in their

131 City of Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825, 830-35 (9th Cir. 1964); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F.2d 412, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 620,
628-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Northwest Elec. Power Co-op v. General Elec. Co., 30 F.R.D. 557
(W.D. Mo. 1961); Barnsdall Ref. Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32 F. Supp. 308, 310-12 (E.D.
Wis. 1940); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939), aff'd on
other grounds, 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941).
140 E.g., United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619, 622 (1930) (dictum); Hudson v. United
States, 272 U.S. 451, 455 (1926) (dictum); Simco Sales Serv., Inc. v. Air Reduction Co., 213
F. Supp. 505, 507-08 (E.D. Pa. 1963). However, a conviction based on a nolo contendere plea
may be admissible for such collateral purposes as impeachment of credibility. Pfotzer v. Aqua
Sys., Inc., 162 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1947).
"I "A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo
contendere. . . ." FED. R. CriM. P. 11; see, e.g., United States v. Dorman, 496 F.2d 438 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 945 (1974) (district court's practice of uniformly rejecting nolo
pleas except in tax evasion cases held not to be an abuse of discretion).
"I Seamans, FirstAid to the Plaintiff, 32 ANTrrRusT L.J. 41, 46 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Seamans].
"I E.g., United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 451, 456 (N.D. Tex. 1957);
United States v. Jones, 119 F. Supp. 288, 290-91 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
In United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167 (S,D.N.Y.
1955), for instance, the court rejected a nolo plea where the alleged violations of the Sherman
Act extended over a nine year period and the alleged violation was for price-fixing, which is
one of the more serious infractions of the Act. The volume of the defendant's business, in
addition, was $30,000,000 out of a total national market of $80,000,000. Nolo pleas were also
rejected by the court in the so-called "Electrical Equipment Cases" out of concern for the
limited resources of the plaintiff State of California. See Note, Noto Pleas in Antitrust Cases,
79 HARv. L. REv. 1475, 1481 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Nolo Pleas].
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discretionary deliberation."' Congress attempted to encourage private treble damage actions by helping injured parties carry their
burden of proof. At the same time Congress also exempted consent
judgments from section 5(a) in order to aid the government enforcement machinery. Congress evidently concluded that the interests of
private plaintiffs should be sacrificed in certain circumstances to
aid the overall government enforcement program. But if the Government, for whatever reason, wishes to expend its resources through
litigation, the only operative policy of section 5(a) is the policy of
aiding private plaintiffs; where this is true, the courts should not
allow the defendant to frustrate the interests of private plaintiffs by
pleading nolo. The courts should, therefore, grant the Government
substantial deference when it contests a nolo plea and should exercise their discretion to compel the defendant either to plead guilty
or attempt to prove his innocence at trial; either a plea of guilty'
or a conviction'47 should, of course, have collateral estoppel effect
according to the analysis presented in this comment.
There is, therefore, nothing in the law of collateral estoppel to
preclude its application when a private antitrust plaintiff follows a
successsful government injunctive action, criminal action, or FTC
proceeding. Consent judgments and nolo contendere pleas, on the
other hand, should not be accorded collateral estoppel effect, although the defendant should not have an unqualified right either to
compel the entry of a consent judgment or to plead nolo. Where a
defendant's proposed consent judgment or nolo plea is opposed by
the Government, collateral estoppel should follow if the defendant
either admits liability or litigates and loses.
IV.

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND THE RIGHT TO TRIAL

BY JURY

Of the three types of government antitrust prosecutions-an
injunctive action, an action brought by the FTC, or a criminal action-only in the criminal action is the defendant entitled to a jury
trial.' Since the defendant in a private treble damage suit is enti"I Seamans, supra note 142, at 52. One commentator has suggested that such factors as
potential aid to treble damage plaintiffs, the government expense if the case goes to trial;
whether or not there is a civil suit pending on the same facts which would give private
litigants the same benefit as a criminal judgment, and the heinousness of the defendant's
alleged crime should all be considered by a court in determining whether to accept a nolo
plea. Nolo Pleas, supra note 144, at 1481-87.
'" See note 136 supra.
" See notes 129-30 supra.
...U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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tled to a jury trial,, it is necessary to determine whether allowing
a prior government injunction or FTC order to have collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent treble damage suit violates the seventh
amendment right to jury trial. 5 '
Under the traditional seventh amendment analysis, 5 ' a
government nonjury judgment could clearly be used in a subsequent
jury trial as collateral estoppel without abridging the defendant's
right to jury trial. The seventh amendment preserves, but does not
extend, the right to jury trial as it existed at common law in 1791.12
Since a common law defendant in 1791 was not entitled to have a
jury hear issues that had been adjudicated in an earlier equitable
proceeding, 5 3 the historical test for determining the right to jury
trial would not preclude the application of collateral estoppel in the
antitrust context.
Recent Supreme Court cases, particularly Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover,'54 have complicated seventh amendment adjudication by recognizing that it will not always be sufficient to examine
the common law of 1791 to determine whether there is a right to jury
55 the Fifth Circuit,
trial in a particular case. In Rachal v. Hill,"
ignoring the historical test but relying heavily on Beacon Theatres,
held that a decree in a prior government action in equity could not
have collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent private action at law
without violating the defendant's right to jury trial. If Rachal is
followed in the antitrust area, the private antitrust plaintiff will be
unable to use a government judgment as collateral estoppel in a
subsequent treble damage suit if the defendant did not have the
right to a jury trial in the prior suit. In order to ascertain the desirability of such a result, this comment will analyze the correctness of
Rachal in light of Beacon Theatres, basic policy considerations, and
other cases.
Fleitman v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916).
The seventh amendment to the Constitution provides that, "In Suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved .... "
1 See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935).
15 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTMcE
38.08[5], at 83 (2d ed. 1974).
15 Shapiro & Coquilette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal
v. Hill, 85 HARv. L. REv. 442, 448-56 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro & Coquilette]. The
authors conclude that the historical inquiry "indicates that in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, determinations in equity were thought to have as much force as determinations at law and that the possible impact on jury trial rights was not viewed with concern
.
If collateral estoppel is otherwise warranted, the jury trial question should not stand
in the way." Id. at 455-56.
'4'
"'

"1 359 U.S. 500 (1959).

155435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971).
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Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover

Beacon Theatres reflects the basic jury trial problems created
by the merger of law and equity effectuated by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.' At common law, a jury trial was available as of
right in any action brought at law but not in equity. The seventh
amendment, by preserving the right to jury trial in actions at law,
maintained the distinction between legal and equitable causes of
action. Although the merger of law and equity in the federal courts
was not intended to affect the right to a jury trial,1 57 the merger
nonetheless made it more difficult for the courts to determine when
the right existed. Because of the merger, the liberal joinder provisions of the federal rules,' 8 and the compulsory counterclaim rule, "
it became common for legal and equitable claims to be presented
in the same action.' The lower courts, aware that the determination of one claim would act as collateral estoppel in the second on
common questions of fact, split on the question of whether the legal
or equitable claims should be heard first. " '
The Supreme Court addressed the problem of proper trial sequence in Beacon Theatres. In this case, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that certain transactions between it and the
defendant were not in violation of the antitrust laws and sought to
enjoin the defendant from instituting any antitrust action regarding
the controversy pending completion of the plaintiff's action. The
defendant counterclaimed at law for treble damages and demanded a trial by jury. Finding the issues raised by the complaint
to be essentially equitable, the district court scheduled a bench
trial of the equitable issues in advance of a jury trial on the treble
'S

Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, "[Tihere shall be one form

of action to be known as 'civil action.'" See generally Morris, Jury Trial Under the Federal
Fusion of Law and Equity, 20 TEXAS L. REv. 427 (1942).
"I Rule 38(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides "[T]he right of trial by
jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment . . . shall be preserved . . . inviolate." 5 J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcncE 38.11[9], at 128.20 (2d ed. 1974).
' FED. R. Civ. P. 18.
'" FED. R. Civ. P. 13.
'" See discussion in Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486,
488-89 (5th Cir. 1961).
"I Three competing rules emerged regarding sequence of trials. One line held that the
determination of sequence of trial should be left to the absolute discretion of the trial judge.
E.g., Orenstein v. United States, 191 F.2d 184, 190 (1st Cir. 1951). A second held that the
nature of the "basic issue" should control. E.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Everglades Discount Co.,
204 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1953). A third held that in the absence of special circumstances,
common factual issues must be tried to a jury. E.g., Leimer v. Woods, 196 F.2d 828 (8th Cir.
1952). See generally Note, Federal Courts: Right to Jury Trial in Cases Involving Both
Equitable and Legal Issues, 47 CALIF. L. Rav. 760, 763 (1959).
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damage claim. The Ninth Circuit, after acknowledging that this
sequence could limit the defendant's opportunity to litigate common factual issues before a jury, denied the defendant's motion
2
for mandamus to vacate the district court's order.'6
On certiorari,6 3 Justice Black, speaking for a five-member majority," 4 stated that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 6 ' which created
a legal remedy where none had existed before, 66 and the merger of
law and equity in the federal courts, which eliminated the need for
equity's traditional principle of refusing to divest itself of jurisdiction because of the subsequent availability of a legal remedy, substantially restricted equity's historic jurisdiction.'6 7 Justice Black
then observed that even though related equitable and legal claims
were often to be tried in one action, the Federal Rules provide that
"the right to jury trial shall be preserved inviolate."' 68 Thus where
legal and equitable claims are joined in the same action, Justice
Black stated, the trial court has only limited discretion in determining the sequence of trial, and "that discretion . . . must, wherever
possible, be exercised to preserve jury trial."'6 9 The Court overruled
the Ninth Circuit on the strength of this principle and held that
mandamus should have issued because the trial sequence ordered
by the district court would have unnecessarily prevented the defendant from litigating its legal claim before a jury. 17° Beacon has
come to mean that in cases involving both legal and equitable elements, there is a constitutional right to a jury trial on common
7
factual issues absent extraordinary circumstances. '
162252 F.2d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
' 356 U.S. 956 (1957).

,e' Justices Harlan and Whittaker concurred in a dissent written by Justice Stewart.
Justice Frankfurter did not participate.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1970).
168 One of the main arguments in the dissent was that the Declaratory Judgment Act did
not create an additional legal remedy but merely a new statutory remedy which could be
either legal or equitable depending on the nature of issues presented. 359 U.S. 500, 514-15
(1959) (Stewart, J.).
167359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959).
,6 Id. at 510; FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a).
"8 359 U.S. at 510.
'7' Id. at 508.
,' McCoid, ProceduralReform and the Right to Jury Trial:A Study of Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 4 (1967) (citing cases at 5 n.18). McCoid suggests that
Beacon Theatres is therefore a "striking departure from history" since equity could no longer
adjudicate an issue material to requested equitable relief if that issue was also material to
requested legal relief. Id. at 5.
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The Interpretation of Beacon Theatres in Rachal v. Hill

In Rachal v. Hill,'72 the plaintiff brought a civil action to recover
damages sustained as a result of violations of the federal securities
laws. The district court found that the defendant's liability had
been established in a prior injunctive action brought by the Securities Exchange Commission. Finding that the defendants had had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the liability issue, the district
court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that the
defendants were collaterally estopped from denying liability.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, but expressly refused to base its
holding that collateral estoppel was improper on the grounds that
the mutuality requirement had not been satisfied. Finding no case
directly on point, 173 the court observed that Beacon Theatres had
established the principle that a litigant has a right to have legal
claims tried first to a jury in an action where legal and equitable
claims are joined.Y4 The court concluded it would be "anomalous"
after Beacon Theatres to hold that a litigant could lose his constitutional right to a jury trial because of a prior adverse determination
in an equitable, nonjury proceeding. 175 Rachal thus extends the defendant's ability to protect his right to a jury trial where legal and
equitable claims are present in one action to the situation where the
equitable action is concluded before the legal action has even
76
begun.1
172435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971).
'1
The Rachal court distinguished an earlier case in its own circuit, Painters Dist. Council 38 v. Edgewood Contracting Co., 416 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1969), which held that issues
litigated in a prior equitable action could have collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent
action at law between the same parties. Rachal distinguished Painters on two grounds. First,
the court distinguished Painterson its facts, observing that since the parties there were the
same in both the first and second actions that case had not "raise[d] the special considerations required to insure justice in cases where mutuality of parties is lacking ....
" 435
F.2d at 63 n.5. Second, the court observed that the right to jury trial issue had not been raised
in Painters.Id. at 63 n.5.
Although the court's factual distinction is correct, it is not a convincing ground for
distinction in light of the general demise of the mutuality requirement acknowledged earlier
in the Rachal opinion. Moreover, the Rachal opinion did not cite two district court opinions
that addressed the jury trial issue and reached results contrary to its own. Mitchell v.
Michigan-U.S. Industrial Glove & Laundry Co., 189 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Mich. 1960); William
Whitman Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 92 F. Supp. 885, 888 (D. Del. 1950).
"' 435 F.2d at 64.
,15Id. Under Rachal, section 5(a) itself is arguably unconstitutional since it makes a prior
equitable determination prima facie evidence in a subsequent legal proceeding. See Shapiro
& Coquilette, supra note 153, at 457.
"76
A third possible situation is where two suits regarding the same action are being
litigated separately at the same time. In Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Edelstein, 494 F.2d 76 (2d
Cir. 1974), a government and a private action were pending concurrently. The defendants in
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Although Rachal's reliance on Beacon Theatres has a certain
initial attractiveness, Beacon Theatres does not in fact support the
Rachal holding.'77 The Court in Beacon Theatres assumed that a
judgment from an equitable proceeding could. estop a defendant in
a subsequent legal action and thereby deprive him of the right to a
trial by jury on issues common to both actions.' Were this not the
case, the sequence in which the equitable and legal claims were
heard would not have troubled the Court. Similarly, the holding
limiting the trial court's discretion in determining the trial sequence
in order to protect the right to jury trial makes no sense unless it is
understood that a prior equitable proceeding can have collateral
estoppel effect in a later action at law. Beacon Theatres only attempted to sort out the difficult problem of determining the sequence of trial when legal and equitable claims are joined in the
same action. It did not, as the Rachal court suggests, also alter the
law of collateral estoppel' to preclude an equitable determination
from having collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent action at law.
The Court has, in cases since Beacon Theatres, reinforced the
assumption that an equitable judgment can be asserted as collateral
estoppel in subsequent legal actions. In both Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood'8 and Meeker v. Ambassador Oil Corp., s ' the Court held,
a civil action filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to stay the nonjury trial until completion
of the jury trial. The court granted mandamus to foreclose the "potential destruction of the
defendant's right to a jury trial." Id. at 78. The dissent, citing Rachal, argued that mandamus
was unnecessary since "one who timely requests the right to a jury trial will not be collaterally
estopped from exercising it by earlier resolution of the issues in a non-jury trial." Id. at 79.
See Comment, Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Edelstein: The Application of CollateralEstoppel
Principlesin Derogationof the Right to Jury Trial, 1974 DUKE L.J. 970.
I" See Shapiro & Coquilette, supra note 153.
118As Judge Friendly stated in Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332, 342
(1973):
The very basis of Beacon Theatres was that the effect of a trial of the equitable claim
"could be, as the Court of Appeals believed, 'to limit the petitioner's opportunity fully
to try to a jury every issue which has a bearing on its treble damages suit'" . . . . It
was to avoid this preclusive effect that the Supreme Court directed initial trial of the
legal counterclaim. (emphasis added)
See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339 (1966); Shapiro & Coquilette, supra note 153, at
446; Note, supra note 161, at 763; Comment, Civil Procedure-Rightto Jury Trialof Factual
Issues Common to Both Legal and Equitable Claims, 45 IowA L. REv. 603, 604 (1960); Comment, Federal Courts-Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions Involving Equitable Claims, 38
Mo. L. REV. 719, 722 (1973); Comment, DiscretionaryJury Trial Under the Federal Rules,
17 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93, 98 (1960).
"I This logical extension of Rachal would compel the overruling of cases holding that
equitable judgments can be asserted as collateral estoppel in a subsequent legal proceeding.
E.g., Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899); see Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966);
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, comment j (1942).
1- 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
191375 U.S. 160 (1963).
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under Beacon Theatres, that the legal claims in those actions had
to be adjudicated prior to the equitable ones. Again, these cases can
only be understood if the right to jury trial can be foreclosed by a
prior equitable determination. In Katchen v. Landy,8 2 the Court
finally made this assumption explicit. In holding that bankruptcy
courts were empowered to try equitable claims prior to legal ones,
the Court observed:
Both Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen recognized that there
might be situations in which the Court would proceed to resolve the equitable claims first even though the results might
be dispositive of the issues involved in the legal claim. 8 '
In other words, the Supreme Court indicated in Katchen that
Beacon Theatres is not to be read, as the Rachal court assumed, as
foreclosing the use of an equitable judgment as an estoppel in a legal
action but rather as an attempt to regulate trial sequence in a consolidated action so as to protect the right to jury trial whenever
possible.
C.

A Policy Evaluation of the Rachal Extension of the Seventh
Amendment

The protection afforded to the right to jury trial by the Supreme
Court in Beacon Theatres and subsequent cases has been relatively
costless in terms of judicial economy. Since the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel will ensure that issues common to
both the legal and equitable claims will be tried only once, a rule
designed to protect the right to jury trial in cases presenting legal
and equitable claims will not produce substantial diseconomies.
The percentage of cases tried to a jury will undoubtedly be increased
by Beacon Theatres, but this additional cost will be sharply limited
by the fact that the issues resolved by the jury will not be retried in
an action involving either of the parties or their privies.
The Rachal holding, on the other hand, would generate substantial diseconomies by guaranteeing a defendant the right to have
a jury rehear issues previously decided against him in an equitable
action with a different party. Foreclosing the second plaintiff from
using offensive collateral estoppel in this situation will generate the
obvious costs of duplicative litigation. Moreover, the Rachal rule
will increase overall litigation even further by giving plaintiffs an
incentive not to join in one action all the defendants against whom
1I2

382 U.S. 323 (1966).

"I Id. at 339.
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they have related claims.' 4 If a plaintiff has a legal claim against
one defendant and a related equitable claim against another, it will
be in his best interests not to join both defendants in the first action
but to bring the equitable action first. By doing so, the plaintiff will
be able to litigate the equitable claim without prejudice to his ability to bring the legal action; the equitable judgment cannot be asserted as collateral estoppel in the legal action under the Rachal
reading of the seventh amendment because a jury had not had an
opportunity to hear the common claims in the prior case.
The Rachal case, moreover, threatens to impose an even more
staggering diseconomy into the judicial system than those outlined
above. The Rachal court offered no convincing reason why the rule
it enunciated should be limited to cases involving a new party. 85' A
litigant who has had an issue determined against him in an equitable proceeding is deprived of his right to a jury trial just as surely if
he is estopped from relitigating that issue in a legal action against
the same party, as if he is prevented from doing so with a different
party. ' The Rachal result, carried to its logical conclusion, would
substantially erode the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel5 7 and would produce a tremendous amount of needless
relitigation. The Rachal extension of the seventh amendment is
thus as unsound on policy grounds as it is in its reliance on Beacon
Theatres.'8 The defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial
should not prevent the application of collateral estoppel when a
private antitrust plaintiff follows a successful government judgment.
D.

Rachal's Progeny: McCook v. Standard Oil Co. of California
In McCook v. Standard Oil Co. of California,' a federal court
' See text and notes at
' See note 173 supra.

notes 70-73 supra.

,u It has been suggested that it would be desirable to extend the Rachal holding to the
two-party situations. See 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 373, 381 (1971).
' See note 179 supra.
'' The dubious theoretical underpinnings of Rachal help to explain its mixed reception
in the federal courts. Compare Lynne Carol Fashions, Inc. v. Cranston Print Works Co., 453
F.2d 1177, 1184 (3d Cir. 1972) (arbitration proceeding where no right to jury trial existed not
given collateral estoppel effect in later damage suit), and Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
323 F. Supp. 990, 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (SEC action in which all parties waived their right to
a jury trial not given collateral estoppel effect in subsequent damage suit), with Crane Co. v.
American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332, 343 n.15 (2d Cir. 1973) (Rachal criticized in dictum)
(Friendly, J.). The opinion in Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Edelstein, 494 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1974),
which did not mention Rachal, can be viewed as implicitly rejecting its basic principle that
equitable decrees cannot have collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent action at law. See
generally Comment, supra note 176.
J&9
393 F. Supp. 256 (C.D. Cal. 1975).

Use of Government Antitrust Judgments

1976]

was recently faced for the first time with the applicability of Rachal
when a private antitrust plaintiff follows a successful government
equitable judgment. Claiming that section 5(a) did not oust the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, the plaintiff argued that the prior
government judgment should collaterally estop the defendant from
denying that it had violated the antitrust laws. The court, rejecting
the plaintiff's contention, held, as in Rachal, that the defendant was
entitled to a jury trial on all legal issues."' But the court, perhaps
recognizing the weak foundation for the Rachal principle, elected
not to base its decision on Rachal's reading of the seventh amendment. Rather, the court stated, because of the "public policy in
favor of jury trials growing out of the Seventh Amendment," Rachal
could be read as creating a "judicial policy exception to the general
doctrine of collateral estoppel," not mandated by the seventh
amendment, but by notions of basic fairness.'
The court's opinion rests on the dubious assumption that there
is a public policy favoring jury trials emanating from the seventh
amendment, but nevertheless independent of it and ignores that as
a historical matter this policy has been inextricably bound with the
seventh amendment.' Where there is no constitutional right to a
jury trial, moreover, it is difficult to justify imposing such a right
on policy grounds. 19 3 When a private antitrust plaintiff follows a
successful government judgment, the policy justifications for allowing the defendant to relitigate issues determined in the government
action before a jury are tenuous at best. The McCook court asserts
that it would be unjust to estop the defendant from relitigating his
liability in this situation."' But it is hard to understand what would
be unjust about estopping the defendant from relitigating issues
which he already has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate." 5 If
the McCook court was implying that an equitable determination is
in itself so inherently unreliable that it does not afford litigants a
"full and fair opportunity" to be heard, then the court was implic10 Id. at 259. By basing its holding on the right to jury trial, the court declined to decide
whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel had been ousted by section 5(a).
Id.

" See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963);
Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752 (1942); Baylis v. Traveller's Ins. Co., 113 U.S. 316
(1885); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
"I Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that policy considerations might call
for curtailing the right to jury trials, it has found these policy considerations "insufficient to
overcome the clear command of the Seventh Amendment." Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,
198 (1974).
"I McCook v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 393 F. Supp. 256, 259 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
1,5Cf. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S.
313 (1971).
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itly advocating drastically revamping the law of collateral estoppel
and res judicata-it would be just as unfair to allow an equitable
judgment to be the basis of res judicata or collateral estoppel in the
two-party situation if this assumption were correct. Thus the policy
that seeks to support the McCook principle requires extending the
case to situations where its application would be intolerable.
Recognition of a right to jury trial independent of the seventh
amendment would promote other diseconomies as well. Jury trials
are more expensive and cumbersome than bench trials. 9 ' Moreover,
by depriving the government injunction of collateral estoppel effect
in subsequent legal actions, the McCook doctrine encourages relitigation where the Constitution does not require it and discourages
private enforcement of the antitrust laws. In the final analysis then,
the public policy favoring jury trials does not provide a more satisfactory basis than the seventh amendment for denying government
equitable judgments collateral estoppel effect in subsequent legal
suits.
CONCLUSION

Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act provides that a judgment or
decree shall be prima facie evidence "as to all matters respecting
which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between
[the defendant and the Government]." Section 5(a) was passed to
stimulate private enforcement of the antitrust laws at a time when,
because of the principle of mutuality of estoppel, private litigants
could derive no benefit from a prior government judgment. Since
the mutuality requirement has been largely abandoned, the successful prior government judgment which once would have had no effect
in a subsequent private action would now have conclusive effect in
the absence of section 5(a). Nevertheless, the courts have continued
to give this remedial statute a restrictive interpretation and have
limited the effect of prior government judgments to prima facie
evidence. The irony is apparent-a statute which was designed to
aid private antitrust litigants now deprives this supposedly preferred class of litigants of a right to which they would otherwise be
entitled. This result is not required by the text or legislative history
of the Clayton Act, the law of collateral estoppel or the right to jury
trial. In fact, it will be possible to achieve section 5(a)'s aim of
aiding private enforcement of the antitrust laws only if the courts
"I See generally Shapiro & Coquilette, supra note 153, at note 60.
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recognize that they may and should allow private antitrust plaintiffs to assert prior government judgments as collateral estoppel in
subsequent actions.
Daniel R. Fischel

